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Theodosius Dobzhansky (1973) famously opined that nothing in biology makes 
sense except in the light of evolution. In The Origins of Morality: An Evolutionary 
Account, Dennis Krebs argues that the scientific study of morality is as muddled as biology 
without an evolutionary framework. 
Krebs prefaces the book by noting that he is not writing with you, the 21
st
 century 
reader, in mind. Instead, he is writing for an audience of one: a white-bearded Charles 
Darwin, who must familiarize himself with 130 years of theoretical developments since he 
shared his thoughts on morality in The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex 
(1874). As such, the book offers an excellent summary of many of the epistemological 
underpinnings of contemporary evolutionary psychology. And, perhaps as a courtesy to Mr. 
Darwin, it does so without any of the popular culture references that are ubiquitous across 
many recent books using an evolutionary perspective to explore human behavior. This 
might make the book slightly less appealing to an audience expecting witticisms and 
cartoons, but it also makes it an easy fit as a text for courses in philosophy or psychology.  
Although Darwin might not appreciate the names that Krebs drops when describing 
his first forays into investigating morality from an evolutionary perspective, contemporary 
readers with a background in evolutionary, moral and developmental psychology surely 
will. While cutting his teeth in moral psychology as a graduate student studying under 
Lawrence Kohlberg, Krebs was contacted by Robert Trivers, another young researcher in 
the biology department at the same university. Trivers, the father of some of the 
foundations of modern evolutionary theory, shared with Krebs a draft of a paper that would 
eventually become The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism (Trivers, 1971), which, at the time 
of this review, has over 5500 citations on Google Scholar. The paper, and a series of 
questions and comments posed by Trivers in personal conversations and correspondence, 
led Krebs down a 40-year path of exploring morality using an evolutionary framework. 
After clarifying his target audience (Darwin) and detailing his background in 
studying morality, Krebs raises an important question for a book on morality: What is 
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morality? This is apparently easier posed than answered. Indeed, he provides a poetic line 
from Harvard philosopher R. B. Perry‟s opinion on this issue: “There is something which 
goes on in the world which it is appropriate to give the name „morality.‟ Nothing is more 
familiar; nothing is more obscure in its meaning.” After providing definitions from moral 
philosophers and psychologists William Frankena, Elliot Turiel, Jonathon Haidt, Darwin, 
and Kohlberg, he provides his own: “a set of ideas about how people who live in groups 
should behave in order to meet their needs and advance their interests in cooperative ways” 
(pg. 27). This definition begs some natural questions, such as, “Does morality not apply to 
people who live in groups?” or, “What interests are people advancing?” Ultimately, it feels 
as if comments from U.S. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart on another topic 
summarize definitions of morality best: I know it when I see it. 
Although the definition of morality is, as Krebs quotes from Perry, a bit elusive, 
there seems to be greater agreement regarding some of the important dimensions 
underlying it. Krebs proceeds to explore such topics, including deference and respect, self-
control, altruism and cooperation, for much of the book. Drawing inspiration from the 
rhetorical questions he received from Trivers, he suggests that understanding cooperation 
and altruism in other animals (“primitive” prosocial behaviors, as he calls them) and the 
theoretical framework that accounts for such behaviors, is essential for a comprehensive 
understanding of human morality.  
In presenting the evolution of morality, Krebs hits on several areas of research that 
may be of interest to readers interested in other topics as well. He succinctly describes 
many aspects of the theoretical framework that evolutionary psychologists use to study 
human behavior, including sexual selection, selfish gene theory, costly signaling theory, 
parental investment theory, gene-culture coevolution and, generally, the adaptationist 
approach. In particular, he borrows heavily from arguments made by Geoffrey Miller 
(2007) on sexual selection for moral virtues, Jonathan Haidt (2001) on the idea that moral 
judgments are strongly influenced by intuitions rather than rational, deliberate reasoning, 
and Richerson and Boyd (2005) on the role that gene-culture coevolution may have played 
in shaping human morality. 
Krebs also dedicates space to discussing some common criticisms (and 
misconceptions) of evolutionary psychology, including claims that evolutionary 
psychologists spin “just-so stories” and claims that evolutionary perspectives amount to 
“genetic determinism”. This section is strong overall; Krebs handles such claims 
efficiently, dispassionately and convincingly. Readers familiar with the discipline should 
follow approvingly, while those who are seeing this material for the first time should find 
the information easy to digest. The amount of space dedicated to refuting arguments by one 
specific paper (Lickliter and Honeycutt, 2003) is somewhat strange, though; other papers 
and books have made more aggressive, more inaccurate and more recent arguments against 
the theoretical assumptions made by evolutionary psychologists. One gets the sense that 
this single paper bothered Krebs a great deal, and he has been waiting for years for an 
outlet such as this book to voice his frustrations (frustrations that Krebs (2003) already 
voiced in a direct commentary on that paper).  
The idea that an evolutionary perspective is useful for understanding phenomena 
such as altruism, cooperation, reciprocation and dominance hierarchies will not be 
controversial among readers with a background in evolutionary psychology, and much of 
the literature reviewed in the book will also be familiar to such readers. The appeal of the 
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book to this audience may not be in novelty of content, but rather in opening 
evolutionarily-oriented readers to consider how such topics form the foundations of 
morality. In contrast, the use of an evolutionary perspective to investigate morality may 
seem as revolutionary and eye-opening to readers who are not familiar with the perspective 
as Trivers‟s suggestions were to Krebs 40 years ago.  
Although excellent overall, the book contains some arguments that readers may take 
issue with. It is structured in a manner that contrasts “primitive” aspects of human 
cooperation and altruism – and their underlying psychological mechanisms – from 
“uniquely human” aspects of the same phenomenon. This distinction seems a bit strange 
given that one of the main points of the book is to suggest that stages of moral development 
in Kohlberg‟s cognitive-developmental model – from less mature to more mature – are not 
best understood in terms stages of maturity, but in terms of the specific functions that such 
moralizing mechanisms serve. Additionally, given that the book deals with a broad range of 
topics, researchers specializing in areas touched upon may raise some questions regarding 
how some constructs are defined. For example, Krebs defines conscience as “a mechanism 
that induces people to pass judgment on themselves and their behaviors” (pg. 207). As 
argued recently by Kurzban (2011), a modular approach to psychology, which Krebs 
endorses, renders such definitions suspect by invoking the existence of a general purpose 
self that needs to be condemned by itself to motivate itself to engage in adaptive behavior. 
As another example, disgust researchers may question Krebs‟s claim that disgust associated 
toward sexual acts relates to “spiritual purity” – both on the grounds that maintaining 
spiritual purity does not seem a likely selection pressure to have led to a morally relevant 
psychological adaptation, and on the question of why sexual behaviors would threaten such 
purity in the first place – rather than strategic condemnation of individuals threatening 
one‟s reproductive interests (Kurzban, Dukes, and Weeden; Weeden, Cohen, and Kenrick, 
2008) or avoidance of fitness-reducing sexual acts and partners (Tybur and Gangestad, 
2011; Tybur, Lieberman, and Griskevicius, 2009). Such issues do not limit the utility of 
Krebs‟ main thesis, and they may inspire researchers to generate and test new hypotheses. 
Ultimately, I imagine that Darwin would walk away from his conversation with Krebs 
impressed by the progress that has been made in understanding morality from an 
evolutionary perspective. 
Doug Kenrick (2006) has suggested that the evolutionary perspective has, within 
psychology, become the theoretical equivalent of the Borg, an alien race from the Star Trek 
universe that assimilates other species and technologies into their cyborg collective. Here, 
Krebs lends further support to Kenrick‟s metaphor by showing that evolutionary 
perspectives have and will continue to transform the study of morality. Unlike the 
devastating consequences of triumph from a violent, genocidal alien race, though, this 
assimilation has the potential to transform the way that people think about, and deal with, a 
fundamental source of human cooperation and conflict. 
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